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Mobile technology is one of the most successful technologies on the African 
continent. Personal and professional communication as well as critical 
services like banking and remittances are widely made through mobile 
networks and platforms in Ghana. However, little is known about the 
security of the underlying infrastructure and devices consumers use to 
interact with the mobile network. 
The focus of this project is to determine if the core systems of the mobile 
network operators, the technology infrastructure, and the 2G/3G dongles 
have exploitable security vulnerabilities, demonstrate some of those 
exploits, and make recommendations on how to mitigate or eliminate the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction & Background to the Project 
Mobile telecommunications has been hugely successful in bridging the 
communications gap in Africa. This success has made mobile networks the 
preferred delivery platform for a plethora of services. Traditional services 
like insurance, money transfers, and even critical services like emergency 
response services have been integrated with mobile technology. Mobile 
communications have also given rise to new services like branchless 
banking which allows banks to expand their reach without building new 
architecture 
As dependency on mobile networks continues to grow, it is important to 
assess the security of the infrastructure and associated technologies that 
make-up the mobile ecosystem.  
However, very little scholarly literature has been written on the security 
implications of using mobile networks and associated technologies for the 
many services they provide [1]. This paper is my contribution to the much 
needed body of literature on mobile network security in Ghana and by 




The primary objective of this paper is to determine the security and privacy 
that mobile subscribers can expect from their use of mobile networks. 
The secondary objective of this paper is to provide a survey of the security 
mechanisms in force in the mobile ecosystem in Ghana. 
1.3 Outline of Applied Project 
Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical basis of mobile communications 
security and explores the works of other researchers on the topic of mobile 
network security. The chapter ends with the implications of the research 
findings on mobile network security in Ghana.  
In Chapter 3, the focus is on the architecture of the mobile network and 
vendor-supplied mobile Internet equipment like 3G USB dongles. The 
chapter ends with a close look at the physical and logical architectures of 
SIM cards.  
Chapter 4 delves into the practical assessments of mobile network security 
in Ghana through a multi-layered approach of exploiting perceived 
vulnerabilities across the mobile spectrum in Ghana. It details the tools and 
steps carried out to perform the exploits and documents the results.  
Chapter 5 ties the theoretical concepts in mobile network security with the 
practical implementations of exploits and makes recommendations on what 
can be done to mitigate the risks.  
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Chapter 2: Background and Related Work 
2.1 Chapter Introduction 
In this chapter, I will discuss the theoretical basis of mobile communications 
security. I start with the broader definitions of computer security by 
discussing the CIA triad (confidentiality, integrity, and availability) and 
associated mechanisms and policies. Next, I narrow down to the literature 
about the mobile ecosystem in Ghana and Africa, the security of the mobile 
network channels, and the security of mobile devices using the CIA triad. 
Finally, I will discuss what these concepts assure consumers of when using 
mobile services in Ghana. 
It is known that most of the papers that deal with mobile network security 
are not pure research papers, instead they are papers/presentation slides 
from hacker conferences. The ones that are pure research papers usually 
deal with the theoretical cryptanalysis of various ciphers [1]. In this chapter, 
I present both the theory and the practical implementations of mobile 
network security in Ghana. 
2.2 Computer Security 
Computer security is defined as “the protection afforded to an automated 
information system in order to attain the applicable objectives of preserving 
the integrity, availability, and confidentiality of information system 
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resources (includes hardware, software, firmware, information/data, and 
telecommunications)” [2]. 
My focus will be on the application of computer security to mobile 
telecommunications with special attention to the security afforded 
consumers of mobile network services. As a result, many of my references 
will be to presentation slides and videos of conferences where the security 
of mobile networks and devices were tested.   
2.2.1 Confidentiality 
Confidentiality is defined as “preserving authorized restrictions on 
information access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal 
privacy and proprietary information” [2]. Inherent in the definition are two 
concepts: data confidentiality and privacy.  
Data confidentiality is the assurance that only those duly authorized have 
access to a specific body of information. Privacy is the assurance that 
individuals have control over information that is related to them and control 
over who that information is disclosed to. 
I will be looking at the confidentiality of consumer information as well as 
system information to which only authorized consumers should have access 




Integrity refers to the “trustworthiness of data or resources, and it is usually 
phrased in terms of preventing improper or unauthorized change” [3]. 
Integrity covers three concepts: data integrity, origin integrity, and system 
integrity. 
Data integrity refers to the content of the information. It assures that “the 
information and programs are changed only in a specified and authorized 
manner” [2]. Origin integrity assures that the source of the data is 
authentic. System integrity assures that “the system performs its intended 
function in an unimpaired manner, free from deliberate rate or inadvertent 
unauthorized manipulation of the system” [2].  
My focus will be on the system and origin integrity and whether consumers 
can trust that system information they receive is only from an authorized 
source.  
2.2.3 Availability 
Availability is defined as the assurance that “systems work promptly and 
service is not denied to authorized users” [2]. A breach of availability is the 
disruption of access to or the use of information or an information system” 
[2]. 
Evaluating breaches of availability are beyond the scope of this paper. 
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2.2.4 Policies and Mechanisms 
The implementation of computer security requires certain policies and 
mechanisms. A security policy is defined as “a statement of what is, and 
what is not, allowed” whilst a security mechanism is defined as “a method, 
tool, or procedure for enforcing a security policy” [3].  
2.2.5 Authentication and Access Control 
One mechanism to enforce permission policies is access control. This refers 
to the ability to set limits on access to resources, devices, and application 
as well as control that access. A sub-mechanism that ensures that access 
controls work is authentication. By authentication, users are identified and 
given specific privileges on the computer system or network [2].  
2.2.6 Sandboxing 
When the concepts of access control are applied to applications by creating 
an environment where applications can execute predetermined actions and 
only within that environment, that environment is called a sandbox [3]. 
Sandboxes are useful for isolating applications where their interaction or 
unrestricted access may pose security risks. 
2.3 The Ecosystem 
The mobile landscape in Ghana is divided into two—the mobile network 
operators (MNO) and the Broadband Wireless Access (BWA) operators. The 
BWA licenses restrict the operators to rolling out fourth generation (4G) 
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long term evolution (LTE) networks. MNO licenses are restricted to third 
generation (3G) and voice communications. The regulatory body in charge 
of mobile telecommunications is the National Communications Authority 
(NCA) [4].  
2.3.1 Mobile Network Operators 
Six mobile network operators (MNOs) representing regional and 
international corporations operate Global System for Mobile 
Communications (GSM) and Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) networks 
in Ghana [5]. MNOs have operated in Ghana since 1992 starting with first 
generation (1G) cellular communications and today are moving towards 
fourth generation (4G) technologies.  
The state holds minority shares (30%) in the national carrier, Ghana 
Telecom Company (GT). GT has since been rebranded into Vodafone Ghana 
by majority shareholder, the Vodafone Group, with 70% shares [6]. Other 
operators are the Mobile Telecommunications Network (MTN), which is 
operated by the Scancom Ghana Ltd., a local subsidiary of the continental 
MTN Group [7]. Nigerian telecommunications giant, Globacom Ltd., 
operates the Glo mobile network [8] whilst Sudatel-owned Expresso 
Telecom, provider of the only CDMA network in Ghana, operates the 
Expresso mobile network [9]. The pioneer cellular network, Tigo, is 
operated by Millicom Ghana, a subsidiary of the Luxemburg-based Millicom 
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[10] whilst Indian international conglomerate, Bharti Airtel, operates the 
Airtel Ghana mobile network [11].  
2.3.2 Broadband Wireless Operators 
To encourage competition and overall quality of service in the mobile space 
in Ghana, the NCA reserved fourth generation (4G) network licenses for 
newcomers in the telecommunication space in Ghana. In 2011, the NCA 
issued licenses to three Ghanaian-owned companies authorizing them to 
roll out Long Term Evolution (LTE) networks in the country. The companies 
are Surfline Ltd, GoldKey Properties Ltd, and G-Kwiknet Ltd (now Blu 
Telecom) [12]. 
2.3.3 Subscribers, Coverage, and Availability 
Mobile penetration in Ghana is set at 113% representing over 30 million 
subscribers in a country with a population of just over 26 million [13]. This 
is because individuals typically own multiple subscriber identification 
modules (SIM) cards at a time.  
With over 13 million subscribers comprising over 45% of the market, MTN 
is the largest MNO in Ghana. This is followed by Vodafone (23%), Tigo 
(13%), Airtel (12%), Glo (4%), and Expresso (~0.4%) [13]. For the 
purpose of this paper, I will be focused on GSM networks as the CDMA 
operator (Expresso) accounts for less than 1% of the mobile market. 
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Combined, the MNOs provide comprehensive mobile coverage of inhabited 
places in Ghana at various degrees of signal strength and quality. For data 
communications, all MNOs provide third generation (3G) Internet services 
in urban centers. In suburban and rural areas, Internet connections often 
fall back to much slower second generation (2G) General Pack Radio Service 
(GPRS) or Enhanced Data rates for GSM Evolution (EDGE). This fallback has 
implications for the security of the communication channel as will be shown 
in Chapter 4. 
The reliability of mobile networks, like their data provisions, vary from 
urban centers to rural communities. The NCA monitors the quality of service 
and hands out sanctions to defaulting operators. 
2.3.4 Mobile Internet Devices 
The growth of mobile penetration in Africa has been accompanied by 
increased sales of mobile devices for voice, text, and data communications. 
However, over 80% of mobile subscribers use basic phones without Internet 
capabilities. Only 11% of the total subscriber base use Internet on their 
phones. Of this number, half of them use smartphones which enables a 
richer Internet experience [14]. For the remaining majority, Internet access 
is possible through the use of 3G dongles for mobile Internet or fixed 




2.3.5 Operator Services 
The services available from the mobile network operators range from short 
messaging service (SMS), unstructured supplementary service data 
(USSD), mobile money, mobile broadband, and value added services (VAS). 
Vodafone also provides fixed wireless and cable connections in addition to 
their mobile service whilst Airtel provides fixed wireless in addition to their 
mobile service. 
2.3.6 Uses of Mobile Services 
Besides the services operators offer consumers, mobile networks power 
everyday communication, health delivery, banking, education, e-
commerce, and potentially the democratic process of elections. For 
example, rural dwellers get health-related information and health-worker 
training using mobile phones [15]. All major banks in Ghana provide mobile 
solutions to customers and schools use mobile networks everyday. In the 
2012 election, voters were registered and verified using GSM-enabled 
biometric devices although I could not verify if the GSM feature was used 
[16]. There is also a rise in portable GSM-enabled point of service (POS) 
machines for payments-on-delivery. 
2.3.7 Industry Partners 
Other partners in the mobile industry are the Ghana Internet eXchange 
Association (GIXA), tower operators, mobile equipment vendors, and 
submarine cable operators. Equipment vendors like Huawei supply both 
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internal MNO equipment and consumer devices. This project will look at 
some of these devices.  
2.4 Existing Security Measures  
2.4.1 SIM Card Registration 
The law passed in 2008 requires that all existing mobile network subscribers 
register their subscriber identification module (SIM) cards to continue use 
[17]. It also requires that all new subscribers register their SIM cards upon 
purchase. This is aimed at assisting crime investigation and protecting the 
general public. 
The national regulator, NCA, enforced this law by requiring MNOs to 
deactivate SIM cards that were not registered after a specified period of 
time whilst bearing the cost of the SIM registration process. The registration 
process requires a state-issued legal identification document like a voter ID 
card, passport, or driver’s license.  
The mechanism chosen by the MNOs was to authorize mobile credit vendors 
to register subscribers after inspecting the above documents. The MNOs 
also maintained desks to cater to subscribers who walked into their offices 
to get their SIM cards registered. At the end of the year-long exercise, 17 
million subscribers registered their SIM cards with 2.5 million subscribers 
outstanding who risked deactivation if they did not register in the 90-day 
grace period provided [18]. 
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Sensing fraudulent activities during the 2011 registration exercise, the 
government of Ghana ordered a re-run of the SIM registration in 2014 [19]. 
MNOs have, however, been reluctant to carry out the re-registration 
exercise because of the costs involved. As at the time of this writing, the 
re-registration process has not begun. Later that year, the government 
gave a new directive restricting the number of SIM cards a person can 
register to 10 in an effort to combat SIM box fraud [20], however, I was 
unable to establish if this directive is in operation. 
A further step to validate user registration is using the mobile money 
registration process. Even with a registered SIM card, government issued 
IDs are required for mobile money registration. The vendors of SIM cards 
are not necessarily mobile money merchants so this second layer of ID 
check improves the validation process. 
A new development in the ecosystem is an effort by the government to 
validate subscriber registration using the proposed Interconnect Clearing 
House (ICH). The ICH will serve as the intermediary node through which all 
mobile traffic in the country are routed [21]. MNOs are resisting the 
implementation of the ICH on performance, security, and cost basis. The 
ICH is not in full operation at the time of this writing to allow me to study 




It has been argued, however, that there has not been sufficient debate on 
the impact of SIM card registration on consumers’ privacy and whether it is 
creating surveillance states. In a paper on the emerging dynamics of SIM 
card registration regulations, Donavan and Martin argue that although the 
evidence is inconclusive, the security benefits of SIM registration are 
modest at best. For example, they found a weak link between SIM 
registration and crime detection in Tanzania [22]. 
2.4.2 Securing the Operator 
 It was not possible to study the full infrastructure setup at mobile network 
operator offices and base stations for this project. However, by studying the 
Internet-facing equipment at their offices, I gained some insights into the 
security that is deployed to keep their computer systems secure from 
external threats. In studying those devices, I did not attempt to break into 
their systems using any intrusion techniques, but simply looked out for 
devices that implemented default or no authentication on the services that 
were open to the public Internet. 
A majority of the equipment studied implemented some form of 
authentication on their network equipment but for a few exceptions. The 
most secure devices are inaccessible from the public Internet, but rather 
require encrypted connections like virtual private networks to access them. 
These devices restricted access to only traffic from the internal network. 
The less secure devices had open ports configured with default or no 
14 
 
authentication. This gives attackers total administrative control over those 
devices. 
2.4.3 Securing the Channel 
GSM mobile networks are secured using one or a combination of the A5 
suite of ciphers that were first developed in the 1980s and have been 
improved over the years. The cipher suite comprises of stream and block 
ciphers for encrypting over-the-air traffic in mobile networks. These exact 
specifications of A5/0, A5/1, and A5/2 were developed and kept in secret 
until they were leaked [23]. Subsequent ciphers have been developed 
openly by the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) comprised of 
members across the globe. 
From A5/0 to KASUMI 
The A5/0 cipher does not implement encryption. It was developed for export 
to countries with trade restrictions on encryption technology. The A5/1 
cipher, however, became the standard for securing GSM data. The A5/1 is 
a stream cipher with a key size of 56 bits in standard implementations. The 
A5/1 cipher is used to secure communication over second generation (2G) 
networks. 
The A5/2 cipher, like the A5/1 cipher, is a stream cipher that was 
intentionally weakened for export. However, barely a month after it was 
released, it was broken showing that the cryptanalysis required would be 
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trivial [24]. Today, mobile networks are prohibited from implementing 
A5/2; instead, no encryption is implemented in the absence of stronger 
ciphers [25].   
The A5/3 cipher was developed by the 3GPP to secure communications on 
third generation (3G) networks and to upgrade 2G network security. Also 
known as KASUMI, the A5/3 cipher is a block cipher that uses 128-bit key 
sizes [31]. The cipher can be implemented for GPRS and EDGE for securing 
user and signaling data over the air interface. 
The f8 and f9 algorithms are improvements to the KASUMI cipher for 
ensuring confidentiality and integrity. The confidentiality algorithm, f8, is a 
stream cipher that uses a KASUMI-based key generator to encrypt/decrypt 
data blocks of sizes ranging from 1 to 20,000 bits in length [34]. The 
integrity algorithm f9 was designed based on the KASUMI block cipher for 
ease of implementation and compatibility with the f8. The f9 algorithm uses 
an integrity key to computer the message authentication code (MAC) on an 
input message [34]. 
2.4.4 Securing the 3G Dongle 
Out of the box, 3G dongles are locked to the network provider. The software 
on the dongles are also modified to conceal their real names. In some cases, 
even the model of the dongle is modified to make it appear different. For 
example, Vodafone markets their Huawei E303s-2 dongle as Huawei K4201. 
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This makes it difficult to unlock as one cannot unlock a device based on a 
fake model. Whilst this does not provide any real security to either the 
consumer or the MNO, they protect some limited protection of the MNOs 
interests. 
2.4.5 Securing the SIM Card 
Subscriber Identification Module (SIM) cards are the smartcards used as 
the primary means of identifying mobile users. These cards come in two 
forms: the much older SIM card and the more recent Universal SIM (USIM). 
For our purposes, SIM card here refers to USIMs. 
At the physical level, the hardware of the SIM card is designed to avoid 
tampering. Attempting to open the CPU chip, for example, will cause it to 
break. The same holds true for the flash memory which stores the 
encryption keys. The flash memory, or EEPROM, implements a file-system 
(7816-4) that supports access controls and secure messaging [35]. 
Generally, however, the security of the hardware is based on obscurity. [36] 
During the manufacturing process, each SIM card gets a key (Kc) burned 
onto it that is used to encrypt communications. That key is provided to 
MNOs who purchase and resell the SIM cards to their subscribers for two-
way encrypted communications [37]. This key has typically been a DES or 
3DES key although more recent SIM cards use AES keys. 
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SIM cards also implement some form of a Java Virtual Machine that provides 
sandboxing to keep applications isolated from each other. Software updates 






Chapter 3: Architecture and Design 
3.1 Overview 
In this chapter, I will be looking at the architecture of the mobile Internet 
devices. First, I will provide a general overview of the network architecture 
in which these devices operate. I will then take an in-depth look at 3G USB 
dongles from a hardware and software perspective. Finally, I will conclude 
with the architecture of SIM cards. 
3.2 Network architecture  
The mobile network comprises of the core network and base stations that 
connect end users to the mobile network. The core network is also 
connected via a high speed link to the public Internet and to other networks. 
In Ghana, all mobile network operators are also Internet service providers 
so they have access to the national fiber backbone that converge at the 




Figure 1: Simplified diagram of mobile network architecture 
 
Today, all MNOs are interconnected via a mesh network connecting various 
offices across the country. Local (on-net) voice and SMS traffic are handled 
in the originating network whilst off-net traffic is routed over this mesh 









Figure 2: Simple diagram of MNO interconnection 
The major networks implement Huawei telecommunications equipment for 
their in-house telecommunications infrastructure whilst renting space on 
masts operated by private tower companies. Not much has been written 
about the physical infrastructure of MNOs in Ghana. 
3.3 Device architecture 
Consumers can access mobile broadband through Internet-enabled phones, 
USB dongles/wingles, or mobile Wi-Fi (MiFi) devices. Besides phones, 
mobile broadband devices are almost exclusively made by two companies, 
Huawei and ZTE.  
For the purpose of this paper, I obtained three USB modems all made by 
Huawei, E303s-1 from Tigo [38], E303s-2 (marketed as K4201) from 
Vodafone [38], and EC167 from Expresso Telecom [39]. All three devices 









Figure 3: Huawei E303s-1, E303s-2, and EC167 (left) and E303s-1 and 
E303s-2 without external covers (right) 
3.3.1 Physical Architecture 
A close look at the E303s-1 modem shows that it comes built with three 
Hisilicon chips Hi6331rbc, Hi6731arbc, and Hi6481rbc. For storage, it 
includes a Samsung K521F57ACA-B060 NAND-based multi-chip package 
(MCP) which stores the 3G dongle drivers and firmware. The total storage 
capacity of the MCP is not known except that it ranges from 0.013 gigabytes 
to 0.5 gigabytes according to the Samsung’s website [40]. The emulated 
CDROM on the modem of size 30MB shows up when the modem is 
connected to a PC. The modem also includes a physical SD card reader 






Figure 4: Physical architecture of Huawei E303s-1 USB dongle 
3.3.2 Logical Architecture 
At the logical level, the modem contains drivers for Windows, Linux, and 
Mac OS. Using the USB mode switching ability, the dongle can emulate a 
combination of modem, SD card reader, and CDROM devices or individual 
devices when plugged to a computer. USB devices are designed to connect 
different pieces of hardware using a single module. What determines the 
devices that are connected is the USB mode that is set. The mode can be 
set to make the USB device emulate a storage drive, a keyboard, a printer, 
etc. 
 
Figure 5: Logical architecture of USB dongle 
Mobile Partner 
Mobile Partner is the primary vendor software that comes bundled with the 
dongle, customized to show the colors and logo of the MNO the dongle 
USB Module 
Chipsets 
Radio Frequency Module 
SIM Module Storage Module 




Plugins and Configuration files 
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serves. It provides the graphical user interface for performing actions like 
making calls, sending SMS, reading SMS, and configuring mobile access 
point (APN) settings. The Mobile Partner software is bundled with drivers 
and stored in an image file on the modem that emulates a CDROM when 
the dongle is inserted into the PC’s USB port. The CDROM image is read-
only and also contains an installation script for Linux and a Mac OS version 
of Mobile Partner in addition to Windows. 
When installed, Mobile Partner adds processes that run whenever the 
modem in inserted into a PC. A process like OUC.exe, for example, runs 
when the modem is inserted with administrative user privileges (system) to 
search for new updates to the modem software. 
  Figure 





The CDROM image includes several drivers that enable the dongle to 
emulate different devices like personal computer/smartcard (PCSC) 
readers, USB modem, wireless wide area network (WWAN) controller, 
network driver interface specification (NDIS), Bluetooth adapter, GPS 
device, and a virtual serial port. 
 
Figure 7: Drivers common to all Huawei dongles 
Plugins 
The Mobile partner also uses a suite of plugins for performing tasks like 
making phone calls, reading and sending SMS,  setting virtual private 




Figure 8: Plugin files common to Huawei dongles 
 
Configuration Files 
There are a couple of configuration files that determine how the modem 
functions. With these files one can, for example, configure when the Mobile 
Partner software runs, and what authentication method and credential to 
use when connecting to the mobile network for Internet access.  
3.4 SIM Cards 
The Subscriber Identification Module (SIM) is a smartcard for 
communicating on GSM networks. They are “fully programmable computer 
systems” with a real-time operating system. [41] In recent times, SIM cards 
have also been referred to as Universal Integrated Circuit Cards (UICC) 
because of the enhanced functionality made possible by higher 
specifications. The design of the SIM card follows the design of smart cards 
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generally referred to as Java Cards because they are designed to run 
sandboxed Java virtual machines (JVM) for hosting multiple applets [38]. 
3.4.1 Physical Architecture 
 
Figure 9: SIM Card 
 
Each SIM card has a central processing unit (CPU). Modern SIM cards have 
at least a 16-bit sized reduced instruction set computing (RISC) CPU 
onboard. The CPUs clock between 5 and 20 megahertz. They also contain 
volatile random access memory (RAM). Internal RAM size ranges from 
1kilobyte to 4 kilobytes and external RAM (XRAM) is for reserved 
applications. The read-only memory (ROM) onboard ranges from sizes of 6 
kilobytes to over 100 kilobytes and store the core operating system 
(described below). In addition, SIM cards also contain flash storage to 
persist data. Flash storage sizes range from a few kilobytes to 2 Gigabytes 




Figure 10: Hardware architecture of SIM card 
Between the SIM card and the host, SIM cards are connected via a serial 
half-duplex communication interface running at rates between 9.6kbps and 
115kbps. Modern SIM cards also contain stand-alone hardware for speedily 
verifying encryption/cipher signatures and generating random numbers to 
strengthen the encryption process without depending on the CPU [36]. 
3.4.2 Logical Architecture 
 
Figure 11: Logical architecture of SIM card 
SIM cards follow the standardized design of the Java Card called the Java 
Card Open Platform. At the low level are a vendor-specific operating system 
written in Assembly or C for application management, serial 





Vendor-specific Base Operating System 
Java Card Virtual Machine CAMILLE 
Applications 
Global Platform / Java Classes API 
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Above the operating system is an implementation of a JVM called the Java 
Card Virtual Machine (JCVM). The JCVM provides a sandbox for running 
applets by compiling the applet code into a compact version of Java 
bytecode and then executing it in the virtual machine. There are 
alternatives to JCVM such as CAMILLE that skip the Java bytecode step and 
compile directly into machine code using register-based operation codes 
(op-codes), thereby improving speed. However, CAMILLE takes up more 
space because of its extensive use of registers, making it unsuitable for 
space-conscious SIM manufacturers [36]. 
Above this layer are two application programming interfaces (API) that 
provide system level functionality without giving upper layers direct access 
to the JCVM through the use of libraries and system calls. These APIs are 
the Java Classes API and the GlobalPlatform API and are used together in 
SIM applications development. The Java classes API provide a collection of 
Java packages that serve as the foundation of SIM applications. The Java 
classes API combined with the JCVM make up the Java Card Runtime 
Environment (JCRE). The GlobalPlatform API is a language-agnostic 
collection of classes developed by the Open Platform Foundation that can 
also be used by approaches not using JCVMs [36]. 
The topmost layer is for applications. Examples of such applications are 
mobile money applications, banking applications, value added services, and 
roaming control. Applications can be pushed from MNOs to subscribers to 
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ensure that all subscribers have the latest services using over the air (OTA) 
updates. The most popular method of pushing out OTA updates by sending 
multiple binary SMS is being replaced by the use of TCP/IP over GPRS. 
However, once the SIM card is sold to the subscriber (card holder), only 




Chapter 4: Exploits and Results 
4.1 Overview 
To evaluate the security that consumers can expect from the network, I 
took a multi-layered approach of exploiting perceived vulnerabilities across 
the mobile spectrum from the SIM card hardware through to the computer 
systems of the MNOs. Many of these exploits have been created and 
demonstrated by members of the hacker community in mostly European 
environments. It is my attempt to replicate some of those here as well as 
look out for conditions unique to our mobile network environment. 
4.2 Attempted Exploits 
4.2.1 Attacking 3G Dongles 
Purpose: For this exploit, my aim is to determine if USB 3G dongle are 
susceptible to cross site scripting (XSS) attacks. 
Target: The self-service software on Vodafone Huawei K4201 dongle 
Limitation: In this exploit, I did not attempt to exploit the hardware as I did 
not have sufficient information about the architecture to determine 
exploitation vectors. 
Exploit Potential 
Security researchers have exploited the self-care software on dongles to 
retrieve administrator credentials using cross site scripting attacks [42]. 
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In 2013, two Russian security researchers, Nikita Tarakanov and Oleg 
Kupreev, revealed that the USB dongles have insecure software on them. 
These vulnerabilities demonstrated the many possible attack vectors these 
devices provide [43]. Their attack requires physical access to the modem.  
Other researchers have also demonstrated that the USB module in the 
modems can be exploited to turn the modem into malicious human interface 
devices (HID) like keyboards for logging user input [44]. They accomplished 
this by flashing the USB devices with modified firmware that identified the 
USB device to the computer as whatever the attacker chooses from the list 
of possible USB device modes. Their attack also requires physical access to 
the modem. 
The Proof of Concept (PoC) of a cross site scripting attack on the Vodafone 
self-service software is found in Appendix B. 
4.2.2 Impersonating the MNO to Send OTA Updates 
Purpose: For this exploit, my aim was to determine what types of 
communication were allowed over the mobile network channel and whether 
I can impersonate an operator to send binary SMS to other subscribers.  
Target: All mobile networks and Internet enabled phones. 
Limitation: This exploit requires the user’s consent to save the received 
configuration files in their phone. However, it seeks to demonstrate that 
other OTA messages including binary SMS are not filtered on the network. 
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Binary SMS have been used to obtain keys (Kc) from SIM cards remotely 
[41]. 
Exploit Potential 
OTA updates have been used by security researchers to successfully extract 
the encryption signatures that are used to secure SIM cards [41].  
In 2013, a team of researchers at SR Labs in Germany demonstrated that 
SIM cards can be rooted remotely using OTA messages. The technique 
requires sending a binary SMS to a mobile device requesting the SIM to 
perform some unauthorized action. Mobile devices typically forward such 
SMS to the SIM directly. The SIM recognizes that the command received is 
not properly signed and replies with an error and a DES crypto signature. 
The attacker then uses existing methods of breaking 56-bit DES signature, 
using things like rainbow tables. With the key, the attacker can now 
properly sign commands and send them over via binary SMS. Successful 
attacks included rooting the SIM card, running Java viruses to break out of 
sandboxing to read all of memory content like mobile banking and mobile 
payment encryption keys, etc. [41]. 
The Proof of Concept (PoC) of impersonating an MNO to send OTA updates 
is found in Appendix C. 
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4.2.3 Exploiting MNO Core Systems 
Purpose: In this exploit, my aim was to determine if there are vulnerable 
entry points into MNO’s internal network from the public Internet.  
Targets: All Internet-facing devices belonging to mobile network operators. 
Limitation: I limited this exploit to identifying services with either weak or 
no authentication setup because I did not seek/obtain the permission of 
MNOs to penetrate their internal network. I also did not attempt to 
penetrate the MNOs internal network from other services like SMS or USSD. 
The Proof of Concept (PoC) is found in Appendix D. 
4.3 Potential Exploits 
4.3.1 Exploiting SIM Cards and Eavesdropping on Calls  
Purpose: The aim of this exploit would be to remotely extract the encryption 
key of the SIM card that comes from the manufacturer. A secondary aim is 
to listen in on phone calls on the network. 
Target: All SIM cards on GSM networks 
Limitation: I did not have the necessary computing power to crack the keys 
efficiently. In addition, I also did not have specialized equipment. 
Tools 
Hardware: GSM base station (mini would do) or HackRF device, high-end 
PC with graphics processor 
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Software: OpenBTS, Air Probe 
Exploit Potential: Extracting the SIM card’s encryption key allows one to 
gain total impersonating ability over the SIM card. Using regular SMS, the 
attacker can carry out the same exploits that are described under the OTA 
update exploit potential [42]. Despite A5/1 being the most secure of the 
three 2G ciphers, it has been successfully cryptanalyzed to show serious 
weaknesses that allow things like eavesdropping on GSM calls [26], 
impersonation [27], and user tracking [28]. It is documented that the 
cipher, was originally designed with a key size of 128 bits, was weakened 
to use 56-bit key sizes to allow eavesdropping by security services [29]. 
Documents released by NSA whistleblower, Edward Snowden, show that the 
NSA has been able to decrypt A5/1 GSM traffic for some time [30]. 
There have been both theoretical and practical cryptanalysis attempted on 
the KASUMI cipher [32]. It is been proven theoretically that the KASUMI 
cipher can be successfully cryptanalyzed, however, the practicality of such 








Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Overview 
Whilst mobile communication remains a vital part of the daily lives of 
Ghanaians and Africans, there are critical security lapses in the ecosystem 
as this project has shown. The security of these communications vary from 
operator to operator but generally show many signs of weakness. Many of 
the vulnerabilities discovered and exploited in this paper have fixes that are 
documented. This chapter seeks to connect the discovery of vulnerabilities 
with solutions to improve security and mitigate the risk of system 
compromise. 
5.2 MNO Core Network 
The internal networks of all MNOs in Ghana have Internet-facing computing 
devices, some of which still maintain their default access configurations. 
These configurations pose serious security risks because the default access 
credentials, if any, are readily available online. Of the devices encountered 
in this assessment, many of those with default or no authentication display 
explicit warnings about their state to prompt network administrators to 
change them. Clearly, these prompts were not heeded. 
The second vulnerability is the sheer number of ports that are open to the 
public Internet on each device found. Some devices had as many as 14 
ports running various services. Some of these ports were unprotected, 
thereby, giving access to anyone with knowledge of their existence. The 
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many open ports provide many options to an attacker to gain access to the 
internal networks of MNOs. The most prominent culprit is the Telnet port 
(Port 23) which does not provide end-to-end encryption and also comes 
unauthenticated in its default configuration. 
In addition, even for ports implementing encryption, many of them 
displayed headers that gave out revealing information of the device they 
ran on. The header information included things like the version number of 
the services running on them as well as and the operating system. A quick 
lookup of these version numbers on a search engine will show 
vulnerabilities, if any, to which the software is susceptible. 
5.3 OTA Updates 
The exploits demonstrated in this paper show that network filtering is either 
non-existent or ineffective in restricting critical services to mobile network 
operators or authorized organizations. The filtering also seems non-existent 
on inter-network communications as the exploit worked across different 
networks. This makes it possible for remote attacks on mobile devices, 
networks, and even SIM cards. The same mechanism that MNOs use to 
update SIM cards is readily available to anyone on the network without 
authentication or authorization. 
5.4 Network and SIM Card Encryption 
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Whilst the exact type of cipher to encrypt mobile communications in Ghana 
was not determined, one can infer from the presence of second generation 
(2G) technologies that weak forms of encryption (A5/0 or A5/1) are in use. 
Considering that the more secure KASUMI (A5/3) ciphers that secure third 
generation (3G) technologies are not backward compatible with 2G 
technologies, one can postulate that wherever 2G technologies exist, 
communications are insecure. Determining the exact nature of encryption 
in use on 2G networks in Ghana will be a subject of further study.  
Furthermore, whilst this paper did not explore the encryption implemented 
in SIM cards used in Ghana, SIM cards are an important target of exploits. 
Given that many SIM cards implement weak encryption standards like 56-
bit DES, one can assume that the SIM cards in circulation are also 
vulnerable.   
5.5 Device Security 
Internet-enabled devices like the Huawei 3G USB dongles have 
vulnerabilities that not only compromise the security of the communications 
through them, but also the security of the devices they connect to. Cross-
site scripting vulnerabilities enable impersonation attacks whilst USB 




The bright side of this security assessment is that many of the vulnerabilities 
listed have relatively easy solutions. Even for the vulnerabilities that require 
huge financial or time investments to fix, there are immediate steps that 
can make them less susceptible to exploit. My recommendations on fixing 
these vulnerabilities and/or mitigating the risk of exploit start with the 
proverbial low-hanging fruits and move up to the top of the tree. 
The first step is to assess the configurations of network devices to ensure 
that the default configurations are modified and the unused ports are 
closed. This should also include all critical ports that do not implement 
encryption like FTP and Telnet. Once done, a full security audit of the 
network infrastructure can follow to give an accurate picture of the network. 
The second step is to edit out revealing information in headers of 
applications that are open to the public Internet. Whilst this does not solve 
the underlying problem of unpatched software, it introduces ambiguity 
about that particular system. A more concrete solution is to patch the 
applications so that its known vulnerabilities are addressed.  
Network filtering of binary SMS only to authorized parties greatly reduces 
the risk of the remote attacks that are possible through this means.[41] 
Individuals or organizations who need to send or receive binary SMS and 
other OTA updates should register with an MNO or the national regulator to 
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be able to do so. SIM cards can be registered and authorized to perform 
this function. 
MNOs should also demand that device manufactures of 3G USB dongles 
supply patches to known vulnerabilities on the devices. Some of these 
vulnerabilities are the dongle software’s susceptibility to cross site request 
forgery (CSRF) and cross site scripting (XSS). There are no known solutions 
to USB exploits as it affects the core USB protocol [41]. 
On SIM card security, MNOs should replace the SIM cards that implement 
56-bit DES encryption with newer SIM cards implementing AES encryption. 
This can start by selling new SIM cards to new subscribers and extend to 
carrying out a nationwide SIM replacement exercise. 
Communication on the network can be secured by upgrading to third 
generation (3G) technologies implementing the KASUMI (A5/3) cipher. This 
usually requires a replacement of base station equipment as the KASUMI 
cipher is not compatible with 2G technologies which is very expensive. 
5.7 Future Work 
This paper is a maiden attempt to assess security in mobile communications 
in Ghana. The primary focus is to evaluate that security that subscribers 
can expect from using mobile networks. It also surveys the mobile 
ecosystem from both technical and non-technical angles of security. Due to 
the limitations of time and equipment, it was not possible to assess 
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potentially vulnerable systems and equipment or replicate some known 
vulnerabilities. Additionally, as I wrote this paper, new developments 
started to emerge in the mobile telecommunication sector that would be 
interesting to assess. 
Further research is needed to provide in-depth knowledge of the security 
and privacy structures of each stakeholder in the mobile ecosystem.  These 
areas include, but are not limited to: 
1. Security implications of the proposed Interconnect Clearing House 
(ICH) 
2. Security assessment of fixed broadband and fixed wireless equipment 
and networks provided by mobile network operators 
3. Internal security controls at mobile network operator stations and 
offices 
4. Security assessment of SIM cards in Ghana 
5. Security assessment of other mobile Internet devices like 
smartphones and mobile Wi-Fi (MIFI) devices used in Ghana 
6. Security assessment of mobile payment systems 
7. Security implications of using GSM-enabled biometric identification 
systems in Ghanaian elections 
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Appendix A: Technical Terms and Acronyms 
1G – First Generation Wireless Telephone Technology: analog 
2G – Second Generation Wireless Telephone Technology: digital 
GSM – Global System for Mobile 
CDMA – Code Division Multiple Access  
GPRS – General Packet Radio Service: 2.5G 
EDGE – Exchanged Data rates for GSM Evolution: 2.75G 
EGPRS – EDGE General Packet Radio Service: 2.9G 
3G – Third Generation 
UMTS – Universal Mobile Telephone System 
CDMA200 – Code Division Multiple Access 2000 
HSDPA – High Speed Downlink Packet Access: 3.5G 
HSPA+ – High Speed Packet Access Plus = HSDPA + HSUPA (U is uplink): 
3.75G 
LTE – Long Term Evolution 





Appendix B: Exploiting USB Dongle Software with Cross Site 
Scripting (XSS) 
Tools 
Any mobile phone that can send SMS 
Steps 
1. I sent a simple JavaScript code to show an alert box and display a 
message as an SMS 
 
 
2. On the Vodafone self-service portal on the modem, the message 




3. When the user clicks the message in the Vodafone self-care portal, 
the browser runs the script to show the alert box and display the message. 
 
4. Whilst this attack is harmless, it demonstrates that the self-service 
portal of Vodafone is susceptible to cross site scripting which can be used 





Appendix C: Exploiting Over the Air (OTA) Updates 
Tools 
Software: SMS gateway (OzekiNG SMS gateway v4.6.2) 
Hardware: Modem (Huawei E303 USB dongle) 
Steps 
1. Install OzekiNG SMS gateway (free trial) 
2. Connect modem and install modem software (some variation of 
mobile partner) 
3. Run OzekiNG Service Monitor 
4. Open web browser and visit: http://127.0.0.1:9501 
5. Login with default credentials (admin/abc123) 
6. From Service Provider Connections menu, choose “Add service 
provider connection” 
7. In the right content area, click “Install” next to the “GSM/GPRS 
Modem Connection” option 






9. If it detects the modem, it will show you full details of the modem. 
For example 
 
10. Now configure the following fields with the details of your network 
provider. The following are for the Tigo network and SIM card I used. You 









11. Click “Connect in the left sidebar to ensure that the modem is 
detected. The red X should disappear once you are connected. 





13. In the left side bar, scroll down to see all the types of SMSes that can 
be sent. For this demonstration, I will send an Open Mobile Alliance Over-
The-Air configuration for a GPRS connection. So click on OMA OTA and then 
click GPRS Connection 
14. In this field, fill the following fields: To, Name of Settings, Connection 
Access Point Name, GPRS user and password (if required), WAP Proxy 
Settings (if required). Then scroll down and click “Send” 
 




16. Once sent, the recipient number will be shown a configuration prompt. 
Notice that the recipient has no way of knowing the sender of the message 
as no sender address attached to it. 
 
17. If the recipient chooses to save the configuration, that becomes the 
default Internet connectivity setting for the mobile device. If proxy settings 
are sent, the user’s traffic will be channeled through a proxy that might 





Appendix D: Exploiting MNO Internal Systems 
Tools 
Browser 
Telnet-enabled command prompt (optional) 
Steps 
I search for publicly accessible computer systems hosted at the mobile 
network operators in Ghana. For each system found, I scan for open ports 
looking for vulnerable services running on these ports.  
1. I created a free account at http://www.shodan.io/ and logged in 
2. I then searched for mobile network operators using mobile operator 
names as keywords or name of equipment used at MNOs. For example, 
searching for zain country:”GH” will return results from all Zain/Airtel 
devices in Ghana. Alternatively, searching for Huawei Versatile Routing 
Platform Software country:”GH” returns a list of all servers running the 






3. From the results, a number of ports were accessible for each IP 
address. To perform this without Shodan, one can use nmap <IP 
Address> from the Linux terminal to get a list of all ports that are open. 
Shodoan displays what you get when you first access it, so it is easy to tell 
if the system is using default password configurations. 
4. I found three IP addresses without set passwords for the Telnet 
service on port 23. Two of the IP addresses belongs to Vodafone and one 






5. Using a Telnet client, I accessed those ports and was immediately let 
in to the servers and provided instructions to set an administrative 
password. 
 
6. I found the Airtel IP address intriguing because it had 14 ports 
accessible to the public Internet. With further probing, I found that the 





7. On the Samba drive, I had full read/write access. The computer was 
infected and upon my visit, my antivirus software successfully cleaned two 
Trojan horses.  
 
8. It also ran a System Log (Syslog) service on an HTTP port showing 
events on the server.  The Syslog server had default username/password 
configuration (admin/admin). 
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